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YOU CAN’T SAY THAT!: PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE AND 
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA ERA
Micah Telegen*
ABSTRACT
The growing prevalence of privately-owned social media platforms is changing 
the way Americans and their governments communicate. This shift offers new 
opportunities, but also requires a reinterpretation of the First Amendment’s 
proscription of government limitations of speech. The public forum doctrine and 
its proscription of viewpoint discrimination seem particularly stretched by the 
digital revolution and the development of social media. In ongoing cases, litigants 
and courts have invoked the doctrine to limit the government’s ability to ‘block’ 
those who comment critically on government pages—much to the chagrin of those 
who note the private status of the companies hosting the pages and easy work-
arounds to ‘blocks.’
This Note argues that, given recent Supreme Court expansion of the concept of 
viewpoint discrimination, courts may be stretching the doctrine too far. These 
decisions call into question the constitutionality of government use of platforms 
that incorporate viewpoint discriminatory rules—such as hate speech bans—into 
their terms of service.
This Note concludes by proposing a solution: returning to the roots of the 
public forum doctrine. It argues that the question undergirding public forum 
analysis should be whether speech is consistent with the maintenance of the forum 
in which it occurs. If speech can occur without preventing the regular use of a 
forum, government regulation should be prohibited. If not, the government can—
and should—take reasonable steps to maintain the forum for use by all.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2016 election cycle made it clear that social media plays a 
prominent role in the American psyche. At some point, we may 
experience another digital revolution; until then, the privately-
owned social media platform is here to stay.1
Nowhere is this demonstrated more clearly than in the sphere of 
government and politics. True, White House briefings, long the 
vehicle by which the federal government spoke to the people, con-
tinue.2 But, some of President Donald J. Trump’s most memorable 
statements have been made via his two Twitter accounts.3 These ac-
counts, @realDonaldTrump and @POTUS, reach more than 55.7
and 24.5 million ‘followers,’ respectively.4 The Department of Jus-
1. See Mike Isaac & Sydney Ember, For Election Day Influence, Twitter Ruled Social Media,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/technology/for-election-
day-chatter-twitter-ruled-social-media.html.
2. See Callum Borchers, 10 Memorable White House Press Briefing Moments of 2017, WASH.
POST: THE FIX (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/
12/27/10-memorable-white-house-press-briefing-moments-of-2017/?utm_term=
.9e78801c7265.
3. See Donald Trump’s Noteworthy Tweets as President, NEWSDAY (Nov. 30, 2017, 5:40 PM), 
https://www.newsday.com/news/nation/donald-trump-s-noteworthy-tweets-as-president-1.
12632966.
4. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump (last visited Oct. 26, 2018); President Trump (@POTUS), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/POTUS (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). Numbers are approximate and are 
accurate as of November 16, 2018. To provide some context for these numbers: presumably, 
there is some overlap between followers of the two pages. Additionally, some percentage of 
these ‘followers’ are institutional accounts, multiple accounts run by the same individual, 
and fake accounts. Numerous reports suggest that many of President Trump’s ‘followers’
are fake accounts, or ‘bots.’ See, e.g., Ryan Bort, Nearly Half of Donald Trump’s Twitter Followers 
Are Fake Accounts and Bots, NEWSWEEK (May 30, 2017, 4:43 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/
donald-trump-twitter-followers-fake-617873. Finally, there is no requirement that followers 
on any platform be American citizens.
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tice has made it clear that President Trump’s tweets are official 
statements.5 The White House has said the same.6
In recent months, President Trump’s decision to block a num-
ber of critics from his Twitter page has drawn significant attention.7
It has also sparked a wave of litigation—brought by the ACLU, the 
Knight Institute, and like-minded organizations—aimed at Presi-
dent Trump and other government officials engaged in similar be-
havior.8 In the highest-profile case decided to date, the Southern 
District Court of New York ruled that President Trump’s use of 
Twitter’s blocking feature—in connection with his 
@realDonaldTrump account—violated blocked individuals’ First 
Amendment rights.9 Regardless of how similar cases are decided, 
the problems with government presence on privately-owned social 
media pages run even deeper than the blocking phenomenon.
Lower courts’ interpretations of recent Supreme Court jurispru-
dence regarding the public forum doctrine and related First 
Amendment concepts are leading us down a dangerous path. Un-
der these new interpretations, the doctrine cannot be reconciled 
with the reality that government actors rely on privately-owned 
platforms to engage with the public.10
5. See Lorelai Laird, DOJ Says Trump’s Tweets are Official Presidential Statements,
ABAJOURNAL (Nov. 14, 2017, 2:49 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
government_says_trumps_tweets_are_official_presidential_statements.
6. See Elizabeth Landers, White House: Trump’s Tweets are ‘Official Statements’, CNN (June 
16, 2017, 4:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/politics/trump-tweets-official-
statements/index.html.
7. See Issie Lapowsky & Louise Matsakis, Trump Can’t Block Critics on Twitter. What This 
Means for You, WIRED (May 23, 2018, 6:29 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/donald-
trump-blocking-on-twitter-unconstitutional/. “Blocking” refers to a number of mechanisms, 
used by most prominent social media sites, that allow a user to prevent another user from 
interacting with their page. Depending on the site, the “blocked” user will either not be able 
to see the first user’s page or will be prohibited from commenting on it. Similar features 
generally present allow users to delete individuals’ messages from their page, or to hide 
them from view of other users.
8. See Knight Institute v. Trump – Lawsuit Challenging President Trump’s Blocking of Critics 
on Twitter, KNIGHT INST. (updated Dec. 1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/
knight-institute-v-trump-lawsuit-challenging-president-trumps-blocking-critics-twitter; ACLU 
of Maine Sues LePage Over Facebook Censorship, ACLU (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/
news/aclu-maine-sues-lepage-over-facebook-censorship. In one of the most advanced suits to 
date, a federal court in Virginia held that a local official had violated a constituent’s First 
Amendment rights by blocking him on Facebook. See Mark Joseph Stern, Federal Court: Public 
Officials Cannot Block Social Media Users Because of Their Criticism, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (July 
28, 2017, 2:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/07/28/federal_court_
rules_public_officials_cannot_block_social_media_users.html. The decision is discussed ex-
tensively in Part I infra.
9. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), ap-
peal docketed, No. 18-1691 (2d Cir. June 5, 2018).
10. See Social Media Usage within Local Government, PUB. TECH. INST., http://www.pti.org/
news/displaynews.asp?NewsID=280&TargetID=3 (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) [hereinafter 
PUB. TECH. INST.] (documenting the degree to which local government makes use of social 
media).
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Part I of this Note provides a brief primer on the public forum 
doctrine as it stands and explains how courts have applied it to so-
cial media in the wake of Packingham, Matal, Davison, and other re-
cent First Amendment cases. Part II explains the problem: it argues 
that the public forum doctrine in its current state cannot effective-
ly be applied to private networks that lack an alternative platform. 
It also addresses the ramifications of applying the public forum 
doctrine and concurrently deeming bans on offensive speech to be 
viewpoint discrimination. Part III acknowledges the most troubling 
implications of this conclusion and then offers a solution. How do 
we reconcile the government’s need to use social media platforms 
for communication with our desire to enjoy First Amendment pro-
tections in the digital space? Perhaps the answer can be found in a 
return to the intuition at the roots of the public forum doctrine: 
the notion that speech within forums should be allowed so long as 
it is consistent with the forum’s operation.
PART I: THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE IS AT A CROSSROADS
In the wake of the decisions discussed below, government enti-
ties may begin devoting their energies to curating their online 
presence so as to avoid viewpoint-discrimination. Still, based on the 
facts presented in Davison—a case where a government-operated 
social media page was found to be a public forum—and similar lit-
igation around the country, it seems likely that government entities 
will continue to engage in practices that are conceivably at odds 
with the doctrine.11
A. The Basics of the Public Forum Doctrine Analysis
The public forum doctrine—a doctrine which prescribes rules 
limiting the government’s ability to regulate speech in areas creat-
ed for the purpose of speech12—devotes significant attention to 
evaluating what ‘type’ of forum has been created.13 And while 
“viewpoint discrimination is prohibited in all forums,”14 rendering 
11. See, e.g., Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 
2017) (appeal pending).
12. The point of the public forum doctrine is to weigh our desire to protect public 
speech against the need of the government to function.
13. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802–03 
(1985).
14. Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062, 
1067 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006). Viewpoint discrimination is a rule that suggests different outcomes 
for speech on the basis of the view expressed.
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this analysis less important for evaluating the constitutionality of 
hate speech bans, it may be helpful to provide a brief outline of the 
types of forum envisioned by the doctrine. In Perry Education Associ-
ation v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, the Supreme Court laid out 
three basic types of forums: the traditional public forum, the des-
ignated public forum, and the nonpublic or closed forum.15 The 
Court also acknowledged the possibility of a ‘limited public fo-
rum’—a type of designated public forum opened only for certain 
classes or types of speech.16
First, the Court identified “public forums” as places which “by 
long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assem-
bly or debate.”17 Streets and parks are typical examples of this type 
of ‘traditional public forum.’18 In these forums, “the rights of the 
state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”19 Even 
content-based restrictions (as opposed to viewpoint-based) are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny.20 Content-neutral restrictions are permissible, 
but they are subject to a similar analysis.21
The Court also identified a category of “public property which 
the state has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive 
activity.”22 Typical examples of this category include university 
meeting facilities, school board meetings, and municipal theaters.23
While these ‘designated public forums’ may not be traditional pub-
lic forums, they are treated as such for the duration of their exist-
ence—that is, for as long as they are used as public forums.24 The 
15. Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (This 
case involved a dispute over access by rival unions to teacher mailboxes and an inter-school
mailing system); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009).
16. See Perry Educ. Ass’n 460 U.S. at 46 n.7, 47 (“A public forum may be created for a 
limited purpose such as use by certain groups for the discussion of certain subjects.”); see also
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (offering an 
example of the Court analyzing a limited public forum).
17. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also, e.g., Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Michigan, 805 F. 3d. 228, 246–47 (6th 
Cir. 2015 (quoting Perry and applying the standard).
20. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 641 (1994) (describing how content discrimination triggers strict scrutiny because it 
“poses the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory 
goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate 
through coercion rather than persuasion.”).
21. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
22. Id. at 45–46; see also, e.g., Keister v. Bell, 879 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing 
Perry and acknowledging the standard).
23. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
24. Id. at 46; see also G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REV. 949, 958 (1991) (acknowledging the consequences of the doctrine).
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government’s ability to limit speech here is subject to the same re-
strictions as in traditional forums.25
The Court also acknowledged an argument from a group of 
teachers that the inter-school mailing system (at issue in Perry Edu-
cation Association) was a “limited public forum” from which they 
could not be excluded.26 As the Court explained in a later opinion, 
“[w]hen the State establishes a limited public forum, [it] is not re-
quired to . . . allow persons to engage in every type of speech.”27
Still, limitations on speech in these forums may not be viewpoint-
based.28
The Court contrasted these public forums with nonpublic fo-
rums: government-owned property opened for a particular pur-
pose not involving speech.29 In these forums, “distinctions in access 
on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity,” impermissible 
in public forums, are generally allowed.30 Viewpoint discrimination 
remains impermissible.31 An example of a nonpublic forum is a 
mailbox.32
It should be noted that some types of public property or services 
are excluded from this category and, for one reason or another, 
are not subject to forum analysis.33 Network television channels are 
an example of such a property where, communicative nature not-
withstanding, no forum exists—and therefore the doctrine does 
not apply.34
B. Applying the Public Forum Doctrine to the Digital Age
Even before the wave of “blocking” litigation that commenced in 
2016 (described supra Introduction), there was some doctrinal 
support for the notion that a government-run, online, interactive 
25. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46; Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 
505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
26. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 47.
27. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. School, 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001); see also Barrett v. 
Walker Cty. School Dist., 872 F.3d. 1209, 1225 (citing Good News Club and applying the rule 
to a school board meeting).
28. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106; see also, e.g., Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d. 697, 715 
(8th Cir. 2017) (citing Good News Club and finding impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
29. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 49.
30. Id.
31. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981). 
The distinction between subject-matter restrictions and viewpoint-discrimination can be 
blurry. By way of example, limiting the subject covered in a forum to a specific proposal 
would be a subject-matter restriction. Excluding those who oppose the proposal would be 
viewpoint-discrimination.
32. See id. at 132.
33. See Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1043 (5th Cir. 1982).
34. Id.
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forum might be, at the very least, a limited public forum. In Page v. 
Lexington County School District One, the Fourth Circuit held that a 
school website did not become a limited public forum (and thus its 
operators were not limited by the constraints of the public forum 
doctrine) by linking to external sites.35 In making its decision, the 
court leaned heavily on the school district’s exclusive control over 
the content of the page.36 The court also posited that, had some 
facet of the site “transformed [it] into a type of ‘chat room’ or ‘bul-
letin board’ in which private viewers could express opinions or 
post information, the issue would, of course, be different.”37 The 
court’s implication is that enabling the public to ‘post’ or modify 
the content of a webpage would suggest the creation of some sort 
of forum.38
In a 2017 case about access to social media, Justice Kennedy 
equated social media to the modern town square.39 In Packingham,
the Court unanimously invalidated a North Carolina statute that 
prohibited registered sex offenders from accessing social network-
ing sites used by minors.40 Justice Kennedy wrote at length about 
the importance of social media in modern discourse: “Today, one 
of the most important places to exchange views is cyberspace, par-
ticularly social media, which offers ‘relatively unlimited, low-cost 
capacity for communication of all kinds.’”41 Justice Kennedy went 
on to call social media “the modern public square.”42 Justice Alito, 
in his concurrence, complained that the Court’s “undisciplined 
dicta” consisted of “musings that seem to equate the entirety of the 
internet with public streets and parks.”43 Still, it seems likely, espe-
cially given his opinion in Matal, discussed below,44 that Justice 
Alito’s disagreement with the majority’s language was motivated 
largely by the specter of pedophiles preying on adolescents.45
35. See 531 F.3d 275, 285 (4th Cir. 2008).
36. See id. The court noted that the district controlled the website and its content.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 284.
39. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017). Justice Gorsuch did 
not hear the case.
40. Id. at 1731.
41. Id. at 1732. And Justice Kennedy was not the first person to pick up on this aspect of 
the digital revolution. See e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Dalzell, 
J., supporting) (“It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and con-
tinues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country–and 
indeed the world–has yet seen.”), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
42. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
43. Id. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring).
44. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
45. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 173 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]his language is bound to 
be interpreted by some to mean that the States are largely powerless to restrict even the 
most dangerous sexual predators from visiting any internet sites, including, for example, 
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Packingham also suggested that social media technology might be 
moving too quickly for the Court to keep up.46 This raises the pos-
sibility that the Court might decline to lay down any clear jurispru-
dence on the matter for fear of wasted efforts caused by changes in 
the landscape. As Justice Kennedy explained, “[t]he Internet’s
forces and directions are so new, so protean, and so far reaching 
that courts must be conscious that what they say today may be ob-
solete tomorrow.”47
In Matal v. Tam, a First Amendment challenge to a Trademark 
Office determination, Justice Alito—speaking for four members of 
the Court and announcing its decision—made it clear that ‘hate 
speech’ is a viewpoint.48 And while Justice Kennedy (joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) wrote a separate opinion to 
address the possibility of some government speech contexts where 
the viewpoint discrimination rule might not apply, he agreed that
that rules “reflect[ing] the Government’s disapproval of a subset of 
messages it finds offensive . . . . [are] the essence of viewpoint dis-
crimination.”49 The respondent was the Asian-American leader of a 
band who had applied for a trademark for their name: “The 
Slants.”50 After the Patent and Trademark Office rejected the ap-
plication as offensive, The Slants successfully appealed the decision 
to the Federal Circuit.51 The government then petitioned for certi-
orari.52 Affirming the Circuit’s decision, Justice Alito explained 
that, in this context, ‘viewpoint discrimination’ is used in a broad 
sense.53 It mattered little that the “clause evenhandedly prohib-
it[ed] disparagement of all groups.”54 “Giving offense,” Justice Alito 
concluded, “is a viewpoint.”55
teenage dating sites and sites designed to permit minors to discuss personal problems with 
their peers.”).
46. See id. at 1736.
47. Id. Justice Kennedy seems to see this as militating for an approach that favors pro-
tections for speech. “[T]he Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the 
First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that medium.” Id.
48. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017). All eight members of the Court who heard the case 
agreed that the relevant regulation was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. See id.
Merriam-Webster defines hate speech as “speech expressing hatred of a particular group of 
people.” Hate Speech, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
hate%20speech (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
49. Id. at 1766. Justice Kennedy also explicitly rejected an argument that the statute in 
question was viewpoint neutral because it applied in equal measure to any offending or de-
meaning material covered. See id.
50. In this context, ‘Slants’ is a derogatory term for those of Asian descent.
51. Id. at 1754.
52. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2016) (No. 15-1293), 
2016 WL 1593780.
53. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763.
54. See id.
55. Id.
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Matal is particularly relevant for cases involving government ac-
tion on social media. In Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervi-
sors, a federal court in Virginia held that a local official, Randall, 
had violated a constituent’s First Amendment rights by blocking 
the constituent from Randall’s government social media page.56
Judge Cacheris’ opinion in this Section 1983 suit provides a 
framework for how judges might navigate similar situations going 
forward.
Judge Cacheris first concluded that Randall acted under the 
color of state law in creating and operating her “Chair Phyllis J. 
Randall” Facebook page.57 This ruling was necessary to find the 
constitutional violation required in a Section 1983 claim. The 
court listed more than ten factors in reaching this conclusion, in-
cluding that Randall was “an elected official who answers only to 
her constituents” and that “[n]o [county] policy . . . played any 
role in [Randall’s] decision to ban [the plaintiff].”58 The court 
summarized that the page “arose out of public, not personal, cir-
cumstances,” and that Randall had used it as a “tool of govern-
ance.”59
Next, Judge Cacheris concluded that the constituent’s First 
Amendment rights had been violated.60 The court first examined 
whether the blocked post was constitutionally protected.61 The 
court concluded it was, as the comment that drew Randall’s ire was 
a critique of her official conduct.62
The court proceeded to evaluate whether the creation of the Fa-
cebook page had opened a forum for speech.63 Citing Page, the 
court opined that this was just the sort of “‘chat room’ or ‘bulletin 
board’” that the Fourth Circuit had in mind.64 The court explained 
that “[w]hen one creates a Facebook page, one generally opens a 
56. See Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 702 (E.D. Va. 
2017), appeal docketed, Davison v. Randall, No. 17-2002 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017). Note that the 
appeal has generated a number of amicus briefs.
57. Id. at 711.
58. See id. at 714, 719.
59. Id. at 713. This seems to be an application of the analysis in an earlier 4th Circuit 
First Amendment case which reversed a ruling below holding that sheriff’s deputies who 
drove around on the eve of Election Day, removing from circulation newspapers that they 
suspected would be critical of the sheriff, were not acting under color of state law. See Ros-
signol v. Voorharr, 316 F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2003).
60. Id. at 714.
61. See id. at 717.
62. Id. The plaintiff, after confronting the defendant at a public meeting, had accused 
her colleagues in county government of corruption.
63. See id. at 716.
64. Id.
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digital space for the exchange of ideas and information.”65 The 
court also suggested that the fact Randall had affirmatively asked 
her constituents to weigh in with their thoughts indicated the crea-
tion of a forum.66
The type of forum Randall created with her page is unclear, as 
the court declined to reach a ruling on this matter.67 It explained 
that this was unnecessary in light of its determination that Randall 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination, which is prohibited in all fo-
rums.68 The court cited Matal’s “giving offense is a viewpoint” lan-
guage and pointed to a portion of Randall’s testimony stating that 
she found the constituent’s accusations “slanderous.”69 The court 
then deemed the constituent’s comment to be just the sort of of-
fensive speech which Matal suggested could not be restricted and 
found that Randall had committed a “cardinal sin under the First 
Amendment.”70
Confusingly, the court then attempted to retreat across some of 
the jurisprudential ground it had just covered by questioning the 
reach of its holding. It cautioned that “a degree of moderation is
necessary to preserve social media websites as useful forums for the 
exchange of ideas.”71 It then suggested that “[n]eutral . . . social 
media policies . . . may provide vital guidance” in avoiding a First 
Amendment disaster.72 This is confusing because Matal seems to 
eliminate the possibility that such a policy, at least to the extent it 
proscribes certain sentiments, could be both effective and constitu-
tionally sound: if hate speech is a viewpoint, then even broad limi-
tations on all hate speech are viewpoint discriminatory and there-
fore unacceptable under the First Amendment.73
In a recently-decided case, the Southern District of New York 
used similar logic to find that President Trump, and his social me-
dia director, could not block respondents on his 
@realDonaldTrump Twitter account without violating their First 
Amendment rights.74 While the basic logic is similar to Davison, the 
case is noteworthy for two reasons: first, because of the public offi-
65. Id. To support this proposition, the court cited Justice Kennedy’s Packingham dicta. 
Id. Whatever else is true of Justice Alito’s concurrence in Packingham, this citation seems to 
suggest that he was correct in suggesting that Justice Kennedy opened a big door.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 716–17.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 717.
70. Id. at 718.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
74. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), ap-
peal docketed, No. 18-1691 (2d Cir. June 5, 2018). The case is currently being appealed.
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cial in question; and second, because the court attempts to apply 
the public forum doctrine to the confusing mechanics of a Twitter 
thread.75
While the limiting dicta in Davison suggests that government en-
tities should be able to create social media policies that avoid vio-
lating the First Amendment, the jurisprudential problems are 
deeper than they might appear at first glance. If courts continue to 
deploy Packingham and Matal to prohibit viewpoint discrimination 
on government-controlled social media pages,76 blocking unruly 
individuals may be the least of the government’s worries. The gov-
ernment may find all use of private social media under attack.
PART II: THE DOCTRINE IS DOOMED
The open-ended nature of Justice Kennedy’s remarks in Pack-
ingham brought the question of how to characterize social media 
profiles within the public forum framework, and the appropriate 
indicia to use in such an analysis, to the forefront.77 But so long as 
Justice Kennedy’s remarks are understood to support the proposi-
tion that at least some government social media profiles are public 
forums,78 then the government’s continued presence on social me-
dia is under threat.
If the government may not discriminate based on viewpoint 
against individuals once they have ‘spoken’,79 it stands to reason 
that the government may not preemptively do the same before 
they have spoken.80 By choosing to host these pages on private plat-
75. See id. at *42 (attempting to identify the actual forum in question in the context of a 
Tweet and the threads that emerge from it). Twitter’s “muting” function also led to some 
confusion. See id. at *8–9.
76. And at least some commentators believe it will. See First Amendment—Freedom of 
Speech—Public Forum Doctrine—Packingham v. North Carolina, 131 HARV. L. REV. 233, 238 
(“[T]he Court’s rhetoric furthered a nascent theory expounded in recent litigation . . . that 
government-administered Facebook pages and Twitter timelines constitute public fora.”)
[hereinafter Packingham Casenote].
77. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 718; Packingham Casenote, supra note 76, at 233 
(“Packingham’s . . . framing of the internet as a public space . . . opened a Pandora’s box, 
with repercussions for certain First Amendment precepts . . . . [T]he Court’s public space
rhetoric implied that the public forum doctrine might be pliable enough to encompass the 
internet and social media[.]”).
78. See, e.g., Packingham Casenote, supra note 75 (repeatedly citing and quoting Packing-
ham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), to reach this conclusion).
79. See id.
80. Such action resembles a prior restraint on speech. Prior restraints tend to be found 
when there is “an administrative system . . . that prevents speech from occurring.” ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.2.3 (5th ed. 2015). 
There is a strong presumption against the constitutionality of such measures. See Nebraska 
Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) ([P]rior restraints on speech . . . are the most 
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”).
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forms which include viewpoint discriminatory language in their 
terms of service agreements (e.g., bans on hate speech),81 the gov-
ernment is doing just that. These service agreements present sig-
nificant doctrinal difficulties and policy problems. Public forum 
doctrine as currently articulated effectively demands that the gov-
ernment abandon social media altogether to avoid a First Amend-
ment violation or limit its presence in some significant but inde-
terminate way.82 This is an impossible choice which demands a 
revision of the doctrine.
A. Government won’t be leaving social media any time soon . . .
Given the popularity of social media in America, it seems likely 
that the government is on social media to stay. A recent study 
found that seven out of ten Americans use social media.83 About 
seventy five percent of Facebook users and fifty percent of Insta-
gram users visit these sites at least once a day.84 And while Face-
book is far-and-away the most popular platform, Pinterest, Insta-
gram, LinkedIn, and Twitter each have millions of users in the 
United States.85 And where Americans go, their government will 
follow. From President Donald J. Trump to the Ann Arbor Police 
Department, government officials and departments have raced to 
establish a presence online.86 As of November 2018, President 
Trump reaches more than eighty million followers through his two 
Twitter accounts, to say nothing of those he reaches on other plat-
forms.87 But it’s not just President Trump. An early 2017 survey 
conducted by the Public Technology Institute found that eighty-
five percent of local government agencies have some sort of social 
media presence.88 New York City’s municipal government utilized 
348 social media channels on at least ten platforms as of November
81. See, e.g., Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-
policies/hateful-conduct-policy (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (banning speech that “directly 
attack[s] . . . other people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, 
gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease.”).
82. See Part B infra.
83. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.
org/fact-sheet/social-media/ [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CTR.].
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., City of Ann Arbor - Police Department, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/annarborpolice/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2018); President Trump 
(@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/potus?lang=en (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
87. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonald
Trump/memberships?lang=en (last visited Nov. 16, 2018); President Trump, supra note 86.
These numbers should be viewed with the caveats offered in note 4, supra, in mind.
88. PUB. TECH. INST., supra note 10.
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2018,89 and a Twitter account set up by NASA for the sole purpose 
of providing updates from the Curiosity Rover has more than 3.9 
million followers.90 Indeed, social media presence has become such 
a ubiquitous element of government operations and strategy that 
an entire industry has sprung up to service needs in that space.91
Social media presence has become a critical part of government 
officials’ communications efforts. A 2015 study surveying congres-
sional staffers found that seventy-six percent of respondents be-
lieved social media “enable[s] us to have more meaningful interac-
tions with constituents.”92 Local and state governments have found 
numerous uses for social media.93 Government officials rely on so-
cial media not only to spread their message but also as a vehicle to 
allow for constituent input and two-way communication.94 Accept-
ing constituent input via social media enables government officials 
and agencies to appear receptive and responsive to constituents.95
But, the government’s use of social media is not limited to facili-
tating constituent input, though. As early as 2011, federal and state 
agencies recognized social media’s potential as a tool for coordi-
nating and targeting emergency services, both routine and during 
disasters.96 Indeed, federal laws call for the Department of Home-
land Security to develop a robust presence on social media for 
such purposes.97 This emergency response use of social media was 
critical to coordination efforts during the 2017 hurricane season, 
89. See Social Media, NYC.GOV, http://www1.nyc.gov/connect/social-media.page (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2018).
90. Curiosity Rover (@MarsCuriosity), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/MarsCuriosity
(last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
91. See GSMCON GOVERNMENT SOCIAL MEDIA CONFERENCE, http://gsmcon.com/
agenda (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (outlining the agenda for an upcoming industry confer-
ence).
92. New Report Outlines How Congress and Citizens Interact on Social Media, CONG. MGMT.
FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2015) http://www.congressfoundation.org/news/press-releases/1123-new-
report-outlines-how-congress-and-citizens-interact-on-social-media [hereinafter CONG.
MGMT. FOUND.].
93. See, e.g., How a Local Government Team of 30+ Serves 1.1 Million Constituents on Social 
Media, HootSuite, https://hootsuite.com/resources/case-study/the-six-steps-fairfax-county-
government-took-to-scale-social-media-across-departments (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (doc-
umenting the numerous ways Fairfax County utilizes social media).
94. Id.
95. See Ross Rinehart, Note, “Friending” and “Following” the Government: How the Public 
Forum and Government Speech Doctrines Discourage the Government’s Social Media Presence, 22 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 781, 831–32 (2013) (summarizing expert research on the subject).
96. See Understanding the Power of Social Media as a Communication Tool in the Aftermath of 
Disasters: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs of the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. (2011) (written statement of Craig Fugate, Administra-
tor, Federal Emergency Management Agency) (“[S]ocial media is extremely valuable to the
work we do.”).
97. DHS Social Media Improvement Act of 2015, 6 U.S.C.A. § 195d (West 2018).
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when a series of storms battered Texas, Florida, and the Caribbe-
an.98
None of these social-media uses are problematic on their own. 
But a closer examination of the terms of service and other limita-
tions on speech that most major social media platforms employ 
suggests that viewpoint discrimination occurs long before the first 
official clicks “block.” Facebook prohibits, among other things, 
“hate speech.”99 Instagram bars content that is “hateful.”100 Twitter 
bans “hateful conduct,” a category of content including speech 
that “directly attack[s] . . . other people on the basis of race, eth-
nicity, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, 
religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease.”101 Twitter has 
also acknowledged that it considers the “newsworthiness” of a post 
when evaluating whether it violates content rules and should be 
removed.102 Even if every other restriction the platforms use is 
deemed acceptable, it seems post-Matal that these hate speech 
bans are viewpoint discriminatory.103 As Justice Alito explained in 
Matal, “giving offense is a viewpoint” that cannot be restrained, 
even by rules that “evenhandedly prohibit[ed] disparagement of 
all groups.”104
Consequently, any time a government page is found to be a pub-
lic forum, and is therefore subject to the prohibition on viewpoint 
discrimination, the government automatically and impermissibly 
limits citizens’ ability to speak in the first instance based on their 
viewpoint. This is either direct government discrimination—by 
choice of a viewpoint discriminatory forum—or, at best, censorship 
by proxy—if the specific violation is the platform’s removal of the 
offending content from the government-created public forum.105
98. See Brian Stelter, How Social Media is Helping Houston Deal with Harvey Floods, CNN
(Aug. 28, 2017, 12:21 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/28/media/harvey-rescues-
social-media-facebook-twitter/index.html (outlining the use of social media to coordinate 
rescue and recovery efforts during Hurricane Harvey).
99. Community Standards III.12: Hate Speech, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/objectionable_content (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
100. Community Guidelines, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/477434105621119/
?helpref=hc_fnav&bc[0]=368390626577968&bc[1]=285881641526716 (last visited Oct. 26, 
2018).
101. Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/
hateful-conduct-policy (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
102. Catherine Shu, Twitter Says It Hasn’t Deleted Trump’s Provocative North Korea Tweet Be-
cause of “Newsworthiness”, TECHCRUNCH (Sep. 27, 2017) https://techcrunch.com/2017/
09/25/twitter-says-it-hasnt-deleted-trumps-provocative-north-korea-tweet-because-of-news
worthiness/.
103. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
104. Id.
105. While the Communications Decency Act of 1996 explicitly protects “Good Samari-
tan” blocking and screening of objectionable material from civil liability regardless of consti-
tutional status, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012), this would not be implicated in a constitutional 
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Some might suggest that, despite their viewpoint discriminatory 
nature, these bans are acceptable because those blocked have ac-
cess to other forums.106 Those blocked could, for example, express 
their views in a letter, or at a protest. But even assuming that there 
is a replacement forum equivalent to posting on Twitter,107 this ar-
gument falls short. The public forum doctrine strongly suggests 
that the government cannot get away with viewpoint discrimination 
by pointing to a hypothetical alternative forum.108
While there is limited precedent regarding public forums creat-
ed on privately-owned digital platforms, one pre-digital analogy 
may be useful for thinking about the relevance of platform-
ownership: a town meeting hosted by a local official at a private 
venue.109 It is plausible that the private location of an event might 
inform the analysis of whether the public forum doctrine should 
apply—perhaps suggesting that the official is not holding the event 
in her public capacity—or inform the analysis evaluating the type 
of forum—suggesting that the forum is, if anything, limited in na-
ture.110 However, to the extent that the government creates a pub-
lic forum on privately-held property, it seems unlikely that the 
property’s owner would be able to effectively grant the ability to 
trample on the rights of those using the forum to the govern-
ment.111 After all, the government cannot free itself of the con-
straints of the Establishment Clause by proselytizing on private 
claim regarding the government’s use of such a webpage. It would be a funny thing if Con-
gress could pass laws explicitly abrogating the Constitution.
106. See, e.g., Thomas Wheatley, Why Social Media is Not a Public Forum, WASH. POST: ALL 
OPINIONS ARE LOCAL (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinions-
are-local/wp/2017/08/04/why-social-media-is-not-a-public-forum/?utm_term=
.30845de8feb0 (arguing that social media pages are not public forums in part because af-
fected constituents may post “essentially the same thing on multiple pages”). Wheatley also 
notes in passing the potential consequences of this ruling for government presence on so-
cial media moving forward, before summarily dismissing it as an unacceptable outcome that 
would be “unfair” to social media platforms. Maybe so, but I am unsure of the doctrinal sig-
nificance of the outcome’s unfairness.
107. This is another situation where the unusual character of social media makes for 
imperfect comparisons. One could imagine a compelling argument that social media offers 
wider exposure and more effective dissemination of views for users commenting on gov-
ernment pages. It might then be argued that no in-person protest or letter to an official can 
provide the user a comparable opportunity to speak. This is an interesting question, but not 
one that needs to be answered here given the doctrine laid out above.
108. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 519 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, § 11.4.2 (“Viewpoint restrictions of speech are virtually never 
allowed.”).
109. Wheatley envisions a similar scenario, though his is a private event on private prop-
erty open to the public. Wheatley, supra note 106.
110. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
111. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 548, 552 (1975) (find-
ing a violation of the First Amendment where plaintiff was denied the right to use a private-
ly-owned theatre leased by the government).
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property.112 By holding a public forum with viewpoint discriminato-
ry rules in place, the government would be violating the First 
Amendment rights of those muzzled.113 The practical consequences 
of building such a loophole into the public forum doctrine would 
be disastrous: public meetings about controversial topics could eas-
ily find their way to private venues operated by those in simpatico 
with the government.114
It is worth drawing a distinction between individual government 
officials and government agencies, if only to highlight why the dis-
tinction does not change the outcome. A city’s fire department 
and an alderman holding public meetings might or might not be 
treated differently for purposes of determining whether they are in 
fact acting in a government capacity.115 It might be more likely that 
an individual legislator is acting as a candidate or a private citizen 
and is not subject to the public forum doctrine at all. But to the ex-
tent that a public forum has been found to exist, as in Davison,116
the identity of the government entity seems less material to a de-
termination of viewpoint discriminatory behavior. Whether the en-
tity responsible for hosting the meeting is a department or an indi-
vidual is irrelevant to the silenced citizen, and the policy problems 
raised by an alternative rule that distinguishes forums based on en-
tity type are numerous. If the government can simply hold public 
meetings in private venues with restrictive policies by ascribing the 
event to a single official, what would stop the government from 
conducting most of its public business in such a manner? While 
proponents of the rule are sure to argue that such an outcome is 
unlikely, the threat seems to undercut the very protections the First 
Amendment affords.
112. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (2014).
113. While not the subject of this Note, the application of public forum doctrine to gov-
ernment social media pages raises another important First Amendment question. Could the 
Establishment Clause be interpreted as prohibiting government officials from tweeting bible 
verses or otherwise expressing religious views? For an excellent summary of the issue, see 
Eugene Volokh, Would Ruling Against Trump in Twitter User Blocking Lawsuit Also Bar Elected 
Officials From Including Bible Verses in Their Political Twitter Accounts?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2017/08/25/would-ruling-against-trump-in-twitter-user-blocking-lawsuit-also-bar-elected-
officials-from-including-bible-verses-in-their-political-twitter-accounts/?utm_term=
.8f314e9317fb.
114. While not the subject of this Note, the strengthening of open meeting laws with 
clauses limiting acceptable venues might be an effective countermeasure.
115. See generally Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 708 
(E.D. Va. 2017) (walking through this analysis for an elected official), appeal docketed, Da-
vison v. Randall, No. 17-2002 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017).
116. Id. at 716. It’s worth noting that the identity of the government entity may well be 
relevant for purposes of identifying whether a public forum exists. See supra notes 57–66 and 
accompanying text.
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The state action doctrine is a logical shield to which the courts 
might turn. The state action doctrine dictates that private parties 
are incapable of violating the First Amendment, which proscribes 
only government action.117 Therefore, as long as the private plat-
form is the entity limiting speech, no First Amendment claim ex-
ists.118
If we perceive the First Amendment violation as occurring when 
the government opens a forum that will inherently and necessarily 
be viewpoint discriminatory because of the platform’s terms of ser-
vice, then the government action requirement is satisfied.119 If, as 
proponents of applying the public forum doctrine must argue, 
there are situations in which ex post viewpoint discrimination by the 
government is impermissible, then why should the same viewpoint 
discrimination be acceptable ex ante? Furthermore, the fact that 
almost all platforms rely on user reports to rapidly respond to 
terms of service violations highlights another flaw in the state ac-
tion requirement argument.120 If, again, there are situations where 
a government official violates an individual’s First Amendment 
rights by blocking his speech directly ex post, the very same govern-
ment official should not be able to achieve the same outcome by uti-
lizing the platform’s reporting feature.121 That these actions should 
produce different doctrinal results defies common sense.122
117. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, § 6.4.
118. See, e.g., Jacquelyn E. Fradette, Note, Online Terms of Service: A Shield for First Amend-
ment Scrutiny of Government Action, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 957 (2013).
119. While some might suggest that social media platforms in particular have such ‘pub-
lic characteristics’ that the First Amendment might apply directly to them, courts have ex-
plicitly rejected this reasoning. See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. 
Supp. 436, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Such an argument would likely try to apply Marsh v. Ala-
bama, a decision where the Court applied the First Amendment to activity on private proper-
ty in a company town. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). For this argument, see Jonathan Peters, The “Sov-
ereigns of Cyberspace” and State Action: The First Amendment’s Application – Or Lack Thereof – to 
Third-Party Platforms, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1015–24 (2017) (arguing that the time has 
come for a new test “allow[ing] courts to compare public and private spaces more generally 
to assess whether a private space is functionally public.”).
120. See supra notes 99–101 (outlining the policing processes used by the various plat-
forms).
121. It is possible to imagine circumstances where a governmental body could argue that 
private restraints on speech apply to what would otherwise qualify as a general-purpose pub-
lic forum. Professor Leonard Niehoff offers the example of a local government entity that 
needs to rent a space within the community that can hold 500 people for a specific meeting 
at which issues of public importance will be discussed. Conversation with Leonard Niehoff, 
Professor from Practice, Univ. Mich. Law Sch. (Apr. 6, 2018). It turns out that the only such 
space in town is a church auditorium, and the church rental agreement provides that anti-
religious speech is not allowed on the premises. On one hand, Niehoff observes, the gov-
ernment might argue that it “can only rent what it can rent” and that the rental agreement 
terms therefore allow it to impose a viewpoint-based restriction on the forum that would 
otherwise be impermissible. Id. On the other hand, he points out, there is a difference be-
tween the church enforcing those terms (by asking someone who engages in such speech to 
leave) and the government doing so (transforming the rental terms into state action). Id. In 
any event, a Twitter account is easily distinguishable from this hypothetical. Twitter accounts 
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Another potential policy problem looms: the retreat of govern-
ment from social media. Even future caselaw holding that the pub-
lic forum doctrine is only applicable when the government explic-
itly articulates that a social media page is meant for a government 
purpose would pose significant problems for government entities. 
As discussed earlier, one of the primary reasons government enti-
ties have established a presence online is to give citizens a way to 
discuss their political beliefs.123 It is possible that some government 
entities (emergency departments come to mind) might be able to 
use language on their pages stating that the page exists solely to al-
low the public report emergencies or for the agency to provide 
public service announcements, possibly taking them outside the 
realm of the public forum doctrine. But for those government offi-
cials and agencies using social media more broadly, it is hard to 
imagine a page that would not exist for the purpose of hearing pub-
lic opinions. After all, the precise appeal of social media pages to 
government entities is the opportunity they afford to engage with 
constituents where they spend most of their time: on the plat-
forms.124 To the extent a page exists to solicit individual speech, a 
ban on hate speech would be viewpoint discrimination.125 A Section 
1983 or Bivens plaintiff could also argue that, even if a page pur-
ports to have a limited purpose, the page’s very existence on a plat-
form that allows for open feedback belies that purpose.126
Neither would a holding that social media platforms are closed 
public forums defeat the problem posed by the platforms’ terms of 
generally do not exist for short periods to address exigent circumstances. And, as Niehoff’s
hypothetical helps demonstrate, it is one thing for Twitter to act based on its own conclu-
sion that its terms of use have been violated and another thing for a state actor to make that 
viewpoint-based judgment. See id.
122. Further lending credence to this conception of state action is the abundance of 
situations in which indirect state action, for one reason or another, satisfies the require-
ment. See Kevin Park, Note, Facebook Used Takedown and it Was Super Effective! Finding a Frame-
work for Protecting User Rights of Expression on Social Networking Sites, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 891, 916 (2013). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 
503–04 (1985) (“There . . . are no clear principles for determining whether state action ex-
ists.”).
123. See CONG. MGMT. FOUND., supra note 92.
124. See id.
125. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
126. It is worth noting that Facebook allows users to disable two-way communication. 
Were a government official to utilize this feature in a robust manner, they could effectively 
create a webpage that does little more than host statements and other content. See
FACEBOOK, supra note 99; see also Blocking People, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/290450221052800 (last visited Nov. 5, 2018). While this might defeat any concerns 
about public forum doctrine, not all platforms allow it, and it seems likely given the previ-
ously mentioned statistics that this is not the use government entities have in mind. See PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., supra note 83.
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service.127 Even in these most restricted of public forums, there are 
limitations to censorship.128 Specifically, speech in closed public fo-
rums cannot be restricted by a desire to suppress certain view-
points.129 Again, Matal suggests that restrictions on hate speech are 
viewpoint discriminatory and therefore in violation of the First 
Amendment when utilized by the government.130
B. . . . but it may not be able to stay there under the public forum doctrine.
Thus, even without Packingham and Davison, it is clear that if the 
public forum doctrine is applied to government pages on social 
media platforms, some of those pages will be found to be public fo-
rums.131 Consequently, government entities may find their ability to 
manage their social media presence constrained. What options do 
they have in the face of this reality, then?
A total government withdrawal from social media is hard to 
fathom. As previously noted, a large number of government enti-
ties have a presence on social media132 and many rely on it heavi-
ly.133 The total withdrawal of all government entities from social 
media profiles would represent a sea change, at odds with the in-
creasingly digital nature of American life. This would be an ironic
blow to the millions of Americans utilizing these platforms to fol-
low and communicate with their governments.134
It is plausible that government entities might remove all social 
media presence that suggests the creation of a public forum. The 
government could limit its presence on social media platforms to 
the public-safety related uses previously discussed, making it clear 
that the pages exist solely to facilitate effective communication be-
127. And while not the subject of this Note, it seems unlikely that, having decided that 
public forum doctrine applies to social media pages, courts would then find them to be 
closed public forums. As previously mentioned, this is a category generally reserved for such 
facilities as schools, military installations, and jails. See supra notes 15–32 and accompanying 
text. While Justice Kennedy’s language in Packingham comparing social media to the town 
square would seem to suggest a traditional forum, rulings that the pages constitute limited 
public forums would also make sense. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
130. See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763.
131. Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va. 
2017), appeal docketed, Davison v. Randall, No. 17-2002 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017); see generally
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (suggesting that these pages are 
hosted in the modern equivalent of the town square).
132. See PUB. TECH. INST., supra note 10.
133. See, e.g., HOOTSUITE, supra note 93.
134. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 83.
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tween government and constituents during emergencies.135 This 
would still represent a significant retreat from the digital world at a 
time when it has become a major component of daily life for many 
Americans.136 This alternative would also impose significant costs 
on government entities as they attempt to determine what type and 
degree of presence they can maintain without creating a public fo-
rum. Asking the government to predict how courts will apply a 
largely fact-driven balancing test to any given fact pattern is setting 
them up for failure.
Government entities may respond by abandoning their social 
media presence entirely, as the city of Redondo Beach did in the 
face of similar concerns.137 Other cities may follow Seattle’s lead in 
prohibiting officials from posting content related to city issues.138 A
2013 note by Ross Rinehart compellingly argues that the threat-
ened application of the public forum doctrine to social media is 
already chilling government uses of platforms.139
PART III: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
We are at a crossroads. We run a risk that the public forum doc-
trine, designed to balance the right of the people to speak in pub-
lic places with the need to maintain these forums, will instead lead 
to the forums’ elimination altogether. Social media is important 
and should be protected.140 However, we lack a doctrinal technique 
for reconciling this value with our desire to let platform-owners set 
rules to limit offensive uses of their platforms, which is expressed 
in the state action doctrine. Put another way, government use of 
135. For purposes of the hypothetical, this Note will assume that an effective doctrinal 
filter could be created that would exclude the subject’s hate speech from the definition of 
“emergencies.”
136. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 83 (highlighting the significant amount of time 
many Americans spend on social media platforms every day).
137. Debra Cassens Weiss, California Town Abandons Facebook Page Amid Legal Concerns,
ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/california_town_
abandons_facebook_page_amid_legal_concerns (noting that the City Attorney was con-
cerned about potential First Amendment violations).
138. Bill Sherman, Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public Officials, Social Networking, and the 
Unmapped New Public Square, 31 PACE L. REV. 95, 106 (2011).
139. Rinehart, supra note 95, at 785. Rinehart’s note offers a glimpse at what may come 
in the wake of more decisions acknowledging the possibility that government social media 
pages are public forums. Even if the government does not abandon social media entirely, 
the opportunity to engage with citizens may be limited significantly. Rinehart also argues 
that the removal of this venue for speech will “contravene citizens’ trust” in their govern-
ment. Id. at 832. Rinehart cites Pew research indicating that most Americans “believe that 
the Internet has had a major impact on the ability of groups to impact society at large.” Id.
140. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017).
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privately-owned social media presents both practical and concep-
tual First Amendment problems.
Part III examines potential solutions that maintain the public fo-
rum doctrine’s current framework. These solutions include a gov-
ernment-operated platform, legislated restrictions on hate speech, 
and a redefinition of the undesirable speech. This analysis ulti-
mately concludes, however, that these solutions are either imprac-
tical, facially unconstitutional, or underinclusive of problematic 
speech. Instead, Part III identifies a simple test as the best path 
forward into the digital age. This approach represents a return to 
the roots of the public forum doctrine: an “apprais[al of] the sub-
stantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the [speech] regu-
lation” in the context in which the regulation occurred.141
First, let’s examine some possibilities that maintain the doctrinal 
status quo. If the need to protect private rights is eliminated, then 
protection for speech can be enshrined. A dedicated, publicly-
owned social media platform would solve the doctrinal problems
presented by the application of the public forum doctrine to social 
media. Since a government entity would be operating the plat-
form, there could be no argument that ex ante viewpoint discrimi-
natory restrictions were private acts that failed to satisfy the state 
action requirement.142
The government-operated platform works conceptually because 
it removes the wrinkle caused by private ownership of a conduit for 
government engagement with the public. The public forum doc-
trine envisions, unsurprisingly, government-owned, -operated, 
and/or -sponsored forums.143 It assumes that the state action re-
quirement will screen out claims arising from private action. By 
removing the question of whether a platform-wide restriction con-
stitutes government action, a government-operated social platform 
would lend itself to a more traditional application of the public fo-
rum doctrine.
And from a doctrinal standpoint, there is a lot to like about this 
government-operated platform approach. If government entities 
limited themselves to one platform or a few platforms that were 
similar in set-up, early litigation could identify factors delineating 
141. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See Carl E. Brody Jr., Considering the 
Public Forum Status of Government Internet Sites, 44 STETSON L. REV. 389, 393 (2015) (explain-
ing that this is “the root of our public forum analysis.”).
142. It is hard to imagine what government entity would be responsible for maintaining 
the platform. The task would be too great for most local entities. Would they instead rely on 
a Federal or State platform? This cross-government platform might complicate matters.
143. See supra notes 15–32 and accompanying text.
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types of forums.144 Government officials and agencies could take 
cues from the courts and create pages with a reasonable sense of 
how the First Amendment would apply. This would then allow offi-
cials to make informed decisions about how to use the platform.145
Officials would also have a clear sense of what limitations could be 
imposed ex ante. Litigation could similarly make clear what sort of 
platform-wide content rules would be constitutional.
But a government platform approach is impractical and unlikely 
to be implemented. The task seems monumental and would likely 
be controversial. The federal government is not known for its effi-
ciency and effectiveness as an operator of widely-used websites.146
And many state and local governments might find the cost of creat-
ing and operating their own platforms hard to bear,147 forcing 
them to rely on a federal platform over which they would have lit-
tle control.148
Still more problematic is the reality that such a platform would 
likely be unappealing to government officials and agencies because 
it would struggle to attract the public. As discussed earlier, gov-
ernment presence on privately-owned social media platforms is 
144. These determinations can focus on very specific fact patterns. See, e.g., Members of 
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (finding that utility poles on pub-
lic property were nonpublic forums).
145. Cf. Kristy Dalton, Why Most Government Social Media Policies Suck, GOV. TECH.:
GOVGIRL (2017), http://www.govtech.com/govgirl/Why-Most-Government-Social-Media-
Policies-Suck.html (observing that “[t]he reality is that there is very little case law to guide us 
in the area of government social media policies.”).
146. Amy Goldstein, HHS Failed to Heed Many Warnings That HealthCare.gov Was in Trou-
ble, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/hhs-failed-to-heed-many-warnings-that-healthcaregov-was-in-trouble/2016/02/22/
dd344e7c-d67e-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html?utm_term=.ec9173bd5597 (chronicling 
the Federal government’s lengthy misadventures in trying to roll out a website to serve those 
seeking healthcare following the passage of the Affordable Care Act).
147. By way of illustration: Ann Arbor, Michigan’s FY 2018 budget noted a little more 
than $15.3 million in unassigned general funds for the year, a rosy fiscal picture. CITY OF 
ANN ARBOR, FY 2018 ADOPTED BUDGET 37 (2018), https://www.a2gov.org/
departments/finance-admin-services/accounting/Documents/FY18%20Adopted%20
Budget%20Book%20-6.20.17%20FINAL.pdf. Facebook, as of June, 30, 2018, had 30,275 
employees. Stats, FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Oct. 26, 
2018). Its total costs and expenses for FY 2017 were reported as $20.45 billion. Facebook, 
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 34 (Feb. 1, 2018), http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.
net/CIK-0001326801/c826def3-c1dc-47b9-99d9-76c89d6f8e6d.pdf. Obviously not every town 
needs to create a platform the size of Facebook. Nonetheless, this is a significant undertak-
ing.
148. For just one example of difficulties getting Federal resources on the same page as 
municipal, state, and regional needs, see the history of the Gateway tunnel project. Despite 
wide understanding that major upgrades to the train tunnels under the Hudson River are 
long overdue, and that the current situation poses a real threat of catastrophic failure, the 
project, announced in 2011, is just now getting funded. See Patrick McGeehan, Spending Deal 
May Breathe New Life Into Gateway Rail Tunnel Project, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://
nyti.ms/2FPwFGe.
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largely a response to the public’s preferences.149 Where Americans 
go, their governments will follow. The start-up costs involved in 
drawing the public to a social media platform are significant; many 
platforms fail due to a lack of interest.150 Government entities may 
well struggle to attract users to a government-only platform.151 Plat-
forms that have ‘made it’ have done so by being hip.152 What could 
possibly be less hip than a government social media site?153 And 
even if some erstwhile letter writers move to the platform, others 
may still be deterred by a perceived lack of privacy.154
At the other end of the spectrum, government entities could 
conceivably avoid offending the First Amendment by withdrawing 
altogether from social media. But this is unappealing for practical 
reasons. As noted earlier, Americans live on social media155 and 
they enjoy interacting with their elected officials in this space.156
Simply put, we want government on social media.
What middle ground can be found between protecting speech 
on social media and maintaining its viability as a conduit for gov-
ernment activity? Some might suggest that privately-held platforms 
should not be in the business of regulating speech in the first place
and that this job is better left to the federal legislature. The theory 
that risk of oppression of minority voices decreases as a democratic 
constituency increases in size predates the Constitution.157 This 
concept resonates in modern-day opinions authored by Justices 
across the ideological spectrum, from Stevens to Scalia.158 Perhaps 
149. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
150. See Amelia Tait, Mastodon.Social: Why Does Every New “Twitter” Fail?, NEW STATESMAN
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/social-media/2017/04/
mastodonsocial-why-does-every-new-twitter-fail.
151. See Fang Wang, Explaining the Low Utilization of Government Websites: Using a Grounded 
Theory Approach, 31 GOV’T INFO. Q. 610, 610, 619 (2014) (documenting low usage of official 
government websites worldwide, even as internet use expands, and suggesting, presciently, 
investigation of social media platforms as a remedy).
152. See Tait, supra note 150.
153. See 6. Perceptions of Elected Officials and the Role of Money in Politics, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/6-perceptions-of-elected-
officials-and-the-role-of-money-in-politics/([L]arge majorities of the public view elected offi-
cials as out of touch . . . .”); see also Josh Butler, Is this the Most Awkward Government Recruit-
ment Ad Ever?, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2017, 10:03 AM), https://www.huffington
post.com.au/2017/02/28/is-this-the-most-awkward-government-recruitment-ad-ever_a_
21862845/ (offering a typical reaction to government outreach efforts).
154. See Tiffany Hsu, For Many Facebook Users, a ‘Last Straw’ that Led Them to Quit, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2FXZdJS (recounting a wave of backlash and exo-
dus from the Facebook platform after reports that a third-party political firm working on 
behalf of President Trump was able to access private data about platform users).
155. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
157. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
158. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 251 (1995) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 523 (1989 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting same section of THE 
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some speech regulation by a large enough constituency might not 
be as worrisome as it would seem at first blush.
From a practical perspective, this approach appears workable. 
Gone is our concern about relying on private entities to police 
public speech, as government would take direct responsibility for 
the job. Speakers, platform owners, and courts will all have clear 
direction as to what restrictions are permissible. Legislators will be 
able to take into consideration their usage needs when drafting 
legislation and will be able to clarify the rules should courts run 
afoul of their intent. There is also some conceptual appeal to this 
approach. After all, the legislature is the vessel through which the 
people maintain their sovereignty.159 If the legislature is the voice 
of the people, a strong argument can be made that it is best posi-
tioned to make decisions about appropriate regulation for the digi-
tal world.160 The legislature is responsible for making laws, after 
all.161
But doctrinally, legislative regulation of hate speech on social 
media is dead in the water. The amendment states, “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”162 And as previ-
ously discussed, recent caselaw makes it clear that prohibitions on 
hate speech are viewpoint discriminatory, which the First Amend-
ment cannot tolerate.163 So how can we enable the legislature to 
regulate the harm we think it should prevent without running 
afoul of the First Amendment? To answer this question, we must 
understand what it is we are trying to prevent. As previously dis-
cussed, the problematic speech that seems to raise the most obvi-
ous constitutional concern is hate speech.164
Black’s Law Dictionary defines hate speech as “[s]peech that 
carries no meaning other than the expression of hatred for some 
group, such as a particular race, especially in circumstances in 
which the communication is likely to provoke violence.”165 Justice 
Alito’s opinion in Matal seems to define protected hate speech as 
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)). While Croson and Adarand are 14th Amendment cas-
es, the prevalence of Madison’s logic in the justices’ thinking is clear.
159. See Enrique Schaerer, Justice Scalia and the Proper Role of a Judge, FEDERALIST SOC.
(Mar. 7, 2016), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/blog-posts/justice-scalia-and-the-proper-
role-of-a-judge (laying out Justice Scalia’s view on the roles of the branches).
160. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 2.143 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
161. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
162. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
163. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
164. See Part II.B supra.
165. Hate Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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“[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, re-
ligion, age, disability, or any other similar ground. . . .”166
These definitions leave some wiggle room, particularly as it per-
tains to speech with the potential to threaten or incite violence. 
Justice Alito’s opinion makes no mention of such speech.167 Black’s
Law Dictionary seems to suggest that speech inciting violence is 
“[especially]” hateful.168 Unsurprisingly, speech that may incite or 
threaten violence (let’s call it ‘dangerous speech’) is of particular 
concern to the proprietors of social media platforms.169 It is also a 
category targeted by many platforms’ policies.170
Crucially, the First Amendment protects neither speech that is 
likely to incite violence or true threats. While the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence has grown steadily more protective of speech,171 even 
the narrow test set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio denies protection to 
speech that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”172 The Court 
has also held that “true” threats are not protected by the First 
Amendment.173 There is play in both of these standards. What is 
‘likely’ to incite lawless action is not a static concept. As for what 
constitutes a “true” threat, the circuits have split about the appro-
priate standard to apply.174
This suggests that narrowed restrictions might not offend the 
First Amendment, even if the public forum doctrine is applied. 
Perhaps government entities could contract with platforms and 
reach specific agreements to prohibit only speech which is left un-
protected by Brandenburg and Watts. Platforms might be willing to 
change their policies to avoid losing some of their highest-profile 
pages or users.175 Perhaps the state or federal government could try 
to pass laws banning violent speech on the internet, though these 
statutes would have to be carefully constructed to avoid being 
found unconstitutionally vague.
166. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1765.
167. Id.
168. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 165.
169. See Update on the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, FACEBOOK (Dec. 4, 2017), 
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/update-on-the-global-internet-forum-to-counter-
terrorism/ (reiterating Facebook’s commitment to curbing the effects of violent speech).
170. See supra notes 99–101.
171. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
172. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
173. See Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
174. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, § 11.3.2.
175. See Aric Jenkins, Facebook Just Revealed 3 Major Changes to its Privacy Settings, TIME
(Mar. 28, 2018, 8:09 AM), http://time.com/5218395/facebook-privacy-settings-changes-
cambridge-analytica/ (outlining changes made by Facebook to stop an exodus of users fol-
lowing revelations of improper access to user data by a political firm employed by the 
Trump campaign).
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Similar work may be done by the fighting words doctrine.176 In 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court made it clear that ‘fighting 
words,’ “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace[,]” are not protected by 
the First Amendment.177
But while these solutions make a lot of sense (perhaps even in-
dependent of the problems raised by this Note), they remain in-
complete.178 Platforms may have very good reasons for wanting to 
ban non-dangerous speech. Perhaps they fear boycotts by offended 
users. Perhaps certain views simply are not in line with ownership’s
ideology. Making sure that platforms can remove violent speech is 
important, but it hardly seems like an adequate answer to the larg-
er issue.
Another possibility is to shield government pages on private so-
cial media platforms from scrutiny under the public forum doc-
trine. This would require judicial acknowledgment of the limita-
tions of the doctrine. The cases could perhaps be distinguished by 
citing the informal nature of the forum or by noting that the for-
mat of the platforms changes quickly.179 A carve out of this kind 
acknowledges the importance of maintaining social media as a fo-
rum for communication between the government and the public 
and prevents an outcome that might induce the government to 
withdraw from the field altogether. From a practical standpoint, 
this seems to work.
But how dissatisfying! This approach saves social media as a fo-
rum for individuals to speak to their government by granting their 
government limitless power to constrain their speech. And a signif-
icant portion of the public clearly expects some protection for 
speech online.180
176. See Shikha Parikh, Your Right to Speak on Government Sponsored Social Media Sites, 50 
MD. B.J. 14, 18 (2017).
177. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
178. And the potential effectiveness of the fighting words doctrine in this context may 
be limited. Some courts have restricted the doctrine’s application to face-to-face interac-
tions. See, e.g., State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755, 767 (Mont. 2013) (finding that the doctrine has 
a face-to-face requirement that was not satisfied by a phone conversation in which the de-
fendant called another individual a “f——— c—-.”); see also State v. Drahota, 788 N.W.2d 
796, 802, 804 (Neb. 2010) (refusing to apply the doctrine to e-mails sent to a professor and 
political candidate accusing him of being an Al-Qaida sympathizer because the target “could 
not have immediately retaliated” and the inflict-injury prong of the doctrine cannot support 
the criminalization of speech “solely because it inflicts emotional injury.”).
179. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
180. See Shine Cho, State of the First Amendment? Many Americans Say it Shouldn’t Protect Di-
visive Campus Speakers, Hate Speech on Social Media, STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR. (June 30, 2017, 
2:28 PM), http://www.splc.org/article/2017/06/newseum-first-amendment-2017-survey.
While a narrow majority of respondents said that the First Amendment should not protect 
hate speech on social media, the results suggest considerable dispute.
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Still, criticism of the public forum doctrine and its current in-
flexible form is widespread.181 Criticism is not limited to the doc-
trine’s application to the digital space,182 with the rigidity of the 
categorical approach coming under fire as label-driven.183 Courts 
have struggled to distinguish between categories,184 despite much 
riding on the outcomes of their decisions. Recent criticism has sin-
gled out the consequences of the doctrine’s inflexibility in applica-
tions to the digital space.185
Perhaps then what is needed, at least in the digital context, is a 
simplification that remains true to the underlying principles of the 
doctrine while providing much-needed flexibility to deal with the 
particulars of a given situation.186 Scholars have advocated for such 
an approach for decades.187 This would finally restore to promi-
nence a principle, present throughout early public forum juris-
prudence, that has been obscured in recent years. The point of the 
public forum doctrine is to weigh our desire to protect public 
speech against the need of the government to function. As the 
Court explained in Grayned v. City of Rockford: “[t]he crucial ques-
181. See e.g., Brody Jr., supra note 141, at 391 (“Unfortunately, certain . . . attempts to 
define the field [of public forum doctrine] have broadened the scope of public forum anal-
ysis and created confusion as to its proper application.”).
182. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 741 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I have 
questioned whether public forum analysis, as the Court has employed it in recent cases, 
serves to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues at hand.”).
183. See, e.g., C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amend-
ment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1987) (positing that the doctrine yields “an 
inadequate jurisprudence of labels” where “[l]egal outcomes depend . . . on what pigeon-
hole of law is determined to apply.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 46, 93 (1987) (“Existing doctrine, with its myopic focus on formalistic labels, 
serves only to distract attention from the real stakes in these disputes.”). The doctrine also 
struggles with other types of digital ex ante speech controls. See Enrique Armijo, Kill Switches, 
Forum Doctrine, and the First Amendment’s Digital Future, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 411, 433 
(2014) (arguing that the doctrine “leaves courts ill-equipped to deal with ex ante speech con-
trols over digital communications.”).
184. See Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33 NOVA L. REV. 299, 
300 (2009) (“Substantial confusion exists regarding what distinction, if any, exists between a 
‘designated public forum’ and a ‘limited public forum.’”); see, e.g., Justice For All v. Faulk-
ner, 410 F.3d 760, 765 n.6 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the “precise taxonomic designation 
of the [limited public forum] remains elusive.”).
185. See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums: First Amendment Limita-
tions on Moderating Public Discourse, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1981, 1982 (2010) (arguing that the 
doctrine’s “formalistic categories and arcane rules” limits “judicial . . . flexibility in dealing 
with” online speech).
186. Members of the Supreme Court have been noting the need for such flexibility for 
some time. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 859–60 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting 
that “the notion of ‘public forum’ has never been the touchstone of public expression” and 
calling for “a flexible approach to determining when public expression should be protect-
ed.”).
187. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 183, at 93 (“Whether the first amendment guarantees 
individuals a right to engage in expressive activities on public property should turn . . . on a 
reasonable accommodation of the competing speech and governmental interests.”).
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tion is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible 
with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.”188
Distilling the doctrine down to this basic question of compatibil-
ity yields results that seem to work rather well for social media. 
‘Mean words,’ such as the ones posted by the plaintiff in Davison,189
would likely be protected. As many readers of this Note are no 
doubt aware, social media can be very rough and tumble.190 While 
this may be viewed as a downside, general name-calling is not in-
compatible with the forum.191 This is a good thing normatively: our 
sense that letting officials screen out mean words is wrong brought 
us here in the first place.192 But while we also aim to protect un-
popular opinions,193 we do not protect them when they are incom-
patible with the normal usage of forum in which they are ex-
pressed.194 Here, protecting hate speech and other types of 
protected speech banned by platforms would be incompatible with 
their continued use as a forum by the government.195 And so, the 
government does not run afoul of this simplified version of the 
doctrine by creating a page where users must adhere to the plat-
form’s rules.
Put another way, applying the simplified public forum doctrine 
to this fact pattern yields two principles: (1) individual, non-
government persons are constitutionally entitled to interact with 
government social media pages as long as they stay within the 
bounds of “normal usage” of the platform; and (2) government ac-
tors on social media may (indirectly, at least) constrain what would 
otherwise be constitutionally protected speech as long as the con-
straint is necessary to maintain their presence on the platform.
188. 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
189. See Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 711 (E.D. Va. 
2017), appeal docketed, Davison v. Randall, No. 17-2002 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017).
190. See Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment 2017, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: INTERNET & TECH.,
(July 11, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017/ (offer-
ing statistics on internet users encounters with harassment and unkind words).
191. See notes 99–101 supra (laying out the rules for the various platforms).
192. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
193. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117 (noting our inability to restrict “unpopular viewpoints”
out of “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint.” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
509 (1969))).
194. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 118 (clarifying that activity which materially disrupts the 
forum, in that case a classroom, may be forbidden).
195. This conclusion, of course, assumes that the private platforms are not state actors 
also subject to the constraints of the First Amendment. See Part II supra. While some have 
argued that this should not be the case, most acknowledge that it is the current state of the 
law. See e.g., Peters, supra note 119, at 1015–24 (concluding that under the current doctrine 
“Facebook could not be described as a state actor,” but also that the time has come for a new 
test “allow[ing] courts to compare public and private spaces more generally to assess wheth-
er a private space is functionally public.”).
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The proposed solution will not end debate. It interprets “normal 
usage” to mean “usage that is not prohibited usage.” An argument 
could certainly be made that ‘normal’ means something narrower 
than that: perhaps usage consistent with some normative interpre-
tation of what is appropriate for the forum. This is a reasonable in-
terpretation, but one that would yield a rule both difficult to ad-
minister and at odds with the notion that speech should not be 
prohibited merely because it is offensive.196
The solution also allows for the possibility that the government 
might limit its presence online to a privately-owned platform with 
restrictive terms of use that limit speech significantly—achieving 
the very end-run around speech protections that we aim to avoid. 
While the worst of these scenarios—a situation where the plat-
form’s terms of use are tailored to the governments preferences—
might be interpreted by viewing the platform as a state actor per-
forming state functions,197 it is easy to imagine situations where so-
cial media platforms, while truly independent, have uncomfortably 
narrow use restrictions.198 The proposed new digital public doc-
trine admittedly encompasses a normative judgment that allowing 
such a possibility is an acceptable cost of maintaining government 
presence on social media.
It is unclear how the courts will decide to deal with the public 
forum doctrine in the digital context. However, it seems likely that 
any decision will be in part the result of a balancing act where our 
desire to limit the harmful effects of dangerous speech is weighed 
against our respect for the protections enshrined in the Constitu-
tion. Given the importance of popular interaction with the gov-
ernment to our society, we can ill afford missteps.
CONCLUSION
Our Founding Fathers enshrined the protection of speech in 
the Bill of Rights; our fondness for ‘Free Speech’ has resulted in 
196. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117 (noting our inability to restrict “unpopular viewpoints”
out of “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint.” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
509 (1969))).
197. The state-actor test currently in use asks the court to examine “(1) ‘the extent to 
which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits’; (2) ‘whether the actor is 
performing a traditional governmental function’; and (3) ‘whether the injury caused is ag-
gravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.’” See Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 
614, 621–22 (1991)).
198. A platform with a ban on ‘mean words’ is a plausible example. Many thanks to Paul 
Hoversten for developing the notion of this hypothetical platform, which he would name 
“Snowflake.”
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jurisprudence creating heightened protections for it. Still, the digi-
tal revolution has carried us into a new age. In many ways, the av-
erage citizen is capable of speaking like never before: her ‘voice’
transiting the globe online, reaching people she has never heard 
of and will never meet. These newfound powers are heady and we 
have seen them used both for good and for evil. We are at a cross-
roads and we must evaluate the meaning of ‘Free Speech’ in this 
digital context. What should be protected and in what forum? I 
submit that building consensus around the answer we do reach will 
be just as important as the answer itself.
